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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a transportation game first introduced by Fotakis,
Gourve`s, and Monnot in 2017, where players want to be transported to a com-
mon destination as quickly as possible and, in order to achieve this goal, they
have to choose one of the available buses. We introduce a sequential version of
this game and provide bounds for the Sequential Price of Stability and the Se-
quential Price of Anarchy in both metric and non-metric instances, considering
three social cost functions: the total traveled distance by all buses, the maxi-
mum distance traveled by a bus, and the sum of the distances traveled by all
players (a new social cost function that we introduce). Finally, we analyze the
Price of Stability and the Price of Anarchy for this new function in simultaneous
transportation games.
Keywords: Transportation, Sequential games, Subgame perfect equilibrium,
Price of Anarchy, Price of Stability
1. Introduction
Transportation systems are widely used every day either to go to work/school
or to travel around the city. For example, if a user is at a bus station and wants to
go to a shopping mall, she would have some options among all buses that travel
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from her location to the mall. However, “time is money”, so it is expected that
(selfish) users will compete for the buses that bring them to their destination
as quickly as possible.
In this work, we aim to investigate the environment where players are com-
peting against each other for the usage of shared resources, commonly called
Resource Allocation Games. In this setting, generally, the resources either are
limited or are associated with a cost, so that resource sharing is necessary or
desirable. More specifically, we study a family of resource allocation games
called Transportation Games. These games were recently introduced by Fotakis
et al. [1], and they model situations motivated by ride-sharing systems like Uber,
Dial-a-ride, or Blablacar. These systems are also important because of their di-
rect impact on the environment in general, as they can induce less pollutant gas
emission and reduce traffic congestion [2].
A (pure) Nash Equilibrium (NE) in a game is an outcome (the actions taken
by each player) where there is no player who can unilaterally decrease her cost
by changing her chosen action. An important metric to evaluate NE outcomes
was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3], which is called Price of
Anarchy (PoA). It is defined as being the largest ratio among all instances of
a game between the worst social cost of an equilibrium and the optimal social
cost of the game. Informally speaking, the PoA provides us the information on
how much the social cost can increase due to the selfishness of the players. For
example, when the PoA has its value far away from 1, it means that the players’
selfish behavior can provoke a significant increase in the social cost.
Another relevant measure of the inefficiency of equilibria is the Price of
Stability (PoS). It was proposed by Anshelevich et al. [4] and, unlike the Price
of Anarchy, it evaluates the largest ratio among all instances of a game between
the best social cost of an equilibrium and the optimal social cost of the game.
As a consequence, we have that PoA ≥ PoS ≥ 1.
Fotakis et al. [1] showed tight bounds on the PoA and the PoS of transporta-
tion games when considering two social cost functions: D (the total distance
traveled by all buses, representing fuel consumption) and E (an egalitarian so-
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cial cost function which measures the largest cost of a user1). Those values can
be seen in Table 1.
These results are related to the simultaneous version of this game where all
players announce their actions (choose their buses) simultaneously. However,
one common criticism of simultaneous games is that we do not have any sense of
the sequence of the actions performed by the players, which can be unrealistic in
some settings. Therefore, we aim to investigate the effect of sequential decision
making in transportation games following a line of recent publications, led by
Paes Leme et al. [5]. In this setting, instead of analyzing Nash equilibria arising
from simultaneous strategic moves, we analyze Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE), which roughly speaking is the outcomes where players act strategically
and farsighted [6].
The Sequential Price of Anarchy (SPoA), introduced by Paes Lemes et al. [5],
is a tool used to measure the lack of central authority in games where players
choose their actions sequentially, following some arbitrary fixed order. It com-
pares the quality of the worst SPE, considering all possible orders of the players,
and the quality of an optimal social outcome. In their work, Paes Lemes et al. [5]
showed that the SPoA has better guarantees when compared with the PoA in
some games. For example, while the PoA is unbounded for the Unrelated Ma-
chine Scheduling game, they showed that its SPoA is bounded. In fact, positive
results showing that the SPoA presents lower values than the PoA has been
displayed for various games ([5, 7, 8, 9]). However, that is not always the case
([10, 11, 12]), and we show that sequential transportation games fall in this
category for all social cost functions analyzed in this paper.
1.1. Main Contributions
First, we define a new social cost function U (from utilitarian), which is
the sum of the cost of the users, and we present the sequential version of the
transportation games. In particular, we give bounds for the SPoA and SPoS for
1The largest cost of a user is, in fact, the largest distance traveled by a bus.
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PoA PoS SPoA SPoS
Function LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
D n n n n n n n n
[1] [1] [1] [1] Thm. 3.3 Thm. 3.3 Prop. 3.2 Thm. 3.3
E 2⌈ n
m
⌉ − 1 2⌈ n
m
⌉ − 1 Ω(n/m) O(n/m) 2n− 1 2n− 1 ⌊ n
m
⌋ 2n− 1
[1] [1] [1] [1] Thm. 3.5 Thm. 3.5 Prop. 3.4 Thm. 3.5
U 2 n
m
− 1 2 n
m
+ 1 2 n
m
− 1 2 n
m
+ 1 2n− 1 2n− 1 2 n
m
− 1 2n− 1
Prop. 4.2 Thm. 4.3 Prop. 4.2 Thm. 4.3 Thm. 3.9 Thm. 3.9 Prop. 3.6 Thm. 3.9
Table 1: Summary of the bounds for the inefficiency of equilibria. The values in boldface are
results of this paper.
all social cost functions considered in this paper (U , E, and D). Most of these
bounds are tight or asymptotically tight, others are asymptotically tight if the
number of buses is constant.
In short, in Section 3, we first show that the value of the SPoS is unbounded
for non-metric instances for all the three social cost functions and, then, we pro-
ceed to show the value of the SPoS and SPoA for metric instances. In Table 1,
we summarize the lower (LB) and upper (UB) bounds for the inefficiency of
equilibria for the metric instances of transportation games, where the columns
of this table represent all measures we use to analyze the inefficiency of equi-
libria: Price of Anarchy (PoA), Price of Stability (PoS), Sequential Price of
Anarchy (SPoA), and Sequential Price of Stability (SPoS).
Finally, we extend the results of Fotakis et al. [1] analyzing the inefficiency
of equilibria associated with function U , by giving bounds on the Price of Sta-
bility (PoS) and Price of Anarchy (PoA) for it (see Table 1 and Section 4).
2. Model and Notation
In this section, we say that a complete graph G = (V,E) is metric if there
is an associated distance function d : E → R+ that assigns metric values for the
edges, i.e., for every x, y, w ∈ V , we have that d(x,w) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, w).
4
2.1. Simultaneous Transportation Game
We first focus on simultaneous transportation games, as introduced by Fo-
takis et al. [1]. An instance Γ of a simultaneous transportation game, is a tuple
(N,M,G), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of n players ; M = {1, . . . ,m} is a set
of m ≥ 2 buses ; and G = (V,E) is a complete undirected graph with a source
node s and a destination node t, where V = N ∪ {s, t}; and d : E → R+ is an
associated distance function. Each player i ∈ N is placed in its corresponding
vertex in G, and they have as a goal to be transported from their location to t,
while minimizing their cost.
An outcome in Γ is an assignment σ : N → M in which every player i ∈ N
chooses one bus j ∈ M (the bus that will pick her up), denoted by σi. We
call P the set of all outcomes and, considering an outcome σ ∈ P , player’s i
cost under σ, denoted by ci(σ), is the distance traveled by σi from location i to
destination t.
An outcome σ ∈ P is a (Nash) equilibrium if no player can decrease her cost
by changing her action, while the action of every other player remains the same.
That is, σ is an equilibrium if, for every i ∈ N and every σ′ ∈ P such that
σi 6= σ
′
i and σj = σ
′
j for all j ∈ N \ {i}, we have that ci(σ) ≤ ci(σ
′).
In order to determine the routes for the buses, we consider that each
bus j ∈M has an algorithm Aj , which, given V
′ ⊆ V , calculates its route
which starts on node s, goes through all vertices of V ′ and finishes its route
on node t. We consider that, as in Fotakis et al. [1], each algorithm Aj , for
j ∈ M , is based on a permutation pij : N → N , given as input, such that a
bus j will only visit players that have chosen bus j, following the order given by
its permutation. That is, bus j will do “shortcuts” in its permutation whenever
it is possible. See the example below.
Example 2.1. Consider the metric instance depicted in Figure 1, where the
cost of the edges not shown are the distance of a minimum path between any
pair of nodes. In this instance we have N = {1, . . . , 5} as the set of players and
M = {1, 2} as the set of available buses. Let pij, for j ∈ M , be the identity
5
t1 4 3 5 2
3 333 3
1 2 2 1
Figure 1: Metric instance with five players and their distances.
permutation, i.e. pij = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), where we can interpret it as bus j following
the path s→ 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 5→ t. Notice that player 4 will always choose a
different bus than the one chosen by player 5 because if she travels together with
player 5, then her cost would be 7, but if she chooses a different bus than player 5,
then her cost would be 3. Let us analyze outcome σ = (1, 1, 1, 2, 1). Observe
that under σ, buses 1 and 2 are going to perform shortcuts in their routes. For
example, bus 2 will follow the path s→ 4→ t. Here, we have the following costs:
c1(σ) = 14, c2(σ) = 8, c3(σ) = 5, c4(σ) = 3, and c5(σ) = 3. Under σ, just
player 1 is willing to deviate and does so. Now, with this modification, we have
the outcome σ′ = (2, 1, 1, 2, 1), and the improved cost of player 1 is c1(σ
′) = 4.
Since under outcome σ′ no one wants to do an unilateral deviation, this is an
equilibrium.
Given an outcome σ, we denote the i-th player picked up by bus j by pji
and |{i : σi = j}| by nj . Also, we abuse notation and consider p
j
nj+1
= t for all
bus j ∈M .
We use three different social cost functions in order to measure the ineffi-
ciency of equilibria, with two of them (D and E) already defined and analyzed
by Fotakis et al. [1]. Since all three functions neglect the distance between s
and the first player picked up by a bus, we will ignore s from now on.
The first social cost function is described as Vehicle Kilometers Traveled,
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which reflects the environmental impact of the game’s outcome. We define
D(σ) =
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
d(pji , p
j
i+1). (1)
Indeed, D(σ) represents the total distance traveled by the buses, except the
distance from s to the first player of each bus.
The Egalitarian social cost function is a classical social cost function in game
theory literature which, in our context, it is the worst traveling distance of a
player. It is defined as
E(σ) = max
i∈N
ci(σ). (2)
Notice that this value is also the maximum distance traveled by a single bus
(again, ignoring s).
In this paper, we introduce the analysis of another social cost function, called
the Utilitarian social cost function, which is also very common in algorithmic
game-theory [13, 14, 15]. This function represents, in the context of transporta-
tion games, the sum of the distances travelled by all players, and it is defined
as
U(σ) =
∑
i∈N
ci(σ) =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N |σi=j
ci(σ). (3)
Thus, U(σ)/n can be seen as the average distance a player will travel to reach
her final destination.
Definition 2.1. Given a transportation game Γ and a social cost function
f : P → R, let NE(Γ) be the set of Nash equilibria of Γ and let σ∗ ∈ P be an
outcome that minimizes f(σ∗). The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of Γ for function
f is defined as
PoA(f,Γ) = max
σ∈NE(Γ)
f(σ)
f(σ∗)
, (4)
while the Price of Stability (PoS) of Γ for function f is defined as
PoS(f,Γ) = min
σ∈NE(Γ)
f(σ)
f(σ∗)
. (5)
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The Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability of a class G of
transportation games are defined by PoA(f,G) = supΓ∈G PoA(f,Γ) and
PoS(f,G) = supΓ∈G PoS(f,Γ), respectively. We will use PoA(f) and PoS(f)
when the class of transportation games G is clear from the context.
Fotakis et al. [1] showed that a NE always exists when all the buses have the
same permutation or in metric instances with two buses, but they also proved
that not all metric instances of this game possess a NE. Because of this, they
analyzed the inefficiency of equilibria of only the instances of the game that do
have a NE. We also make this assumption when analyzing the PoA(U) and
the PoS(U) in Section 4.
2.2. Sequential Transportation Games
In the sequential version of the transportation game, players still choose a
bus j ∈M but, instead of announcing their actions simultaneously, they choose
their actions following an arbitrary predefined order. For simplicity, we con-
sider this order to be (1, 2, . . . , n) as one can always change buses’ permutation
accordingly. Therefore, player i has to choose an action σi knowing only the
actions taken by the players 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. However, because we are consider-
ing a game with full information, when choosing an action, players will indeed
take into consideration their successors’ behavior, so they will be able to fully
anticipate their actions considering that they will behave selfishly.
Because of the game’s sequentiality, for each set of possible actions
σ<i = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1) chosen by the predecessors of player i, player i needs
to specify an action λi(σ<i) to deal with all of those actions, that is, specify
which bus should be chosen if player 1 to i− 1 chooses actions σ<i. We call λi a
strategy, since it defines an action for every possible predecessors’ choices. Also,
we use λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) to refer to the strategies’ choice of all players, which
we call a strategy profile and we denote the set of all strategy profiles by S.
Finally, the outcome of λ is an outcome σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) such that
σi = λi(σ<i) for all i ∈ N , where, again, σ<i = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1). That is, the
outcome of λ is such that σi is the action chosen by player i (according to λ)
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when player j chooses σj for 1 ≤ j < i.
Following the definition given by Shoham and Leyton-Brown [6], we say that
a strategy profile λ is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) if it induces a Nash
Equilibrium in any subgame (the restriction of the game to some σ<i). That
is, λ is a SPE if for all players i and all σ<i, i cannot decrease her cost by
changing to another strategy different from λ(σ<i) in the subgame where σ<i is
fixed for her predecessors (players 1, 2, . . . , i− 1) and λi+1, λi+2, . . . , λn are the
strategies chosen by her successor (players i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n).
Furthermore, we can express the sequential transportation game in its exten-
sive form by considering a rooted m-ary tree, wherein each level i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
player i is responsible for taking decisions of all nodes in her level. In other
words, she has to choose one of the m buses knowing only the decisions of
her i− 1 predecessors. On the leaves (terminal nodes) is the information about
the cost of each player according to that outcome (which can be seen as a path
of choices from the root to that leaf). Since we are dealing with a game with
full information, it always has at least one SPE, which can be computed by
backward induction, using the well-known Zermelo’s algorithm [16].
Regarding the inefficiency of equilibria, Paes Leme et al. [5] introduced the
notion of the Sequential Price of Anarchy (SPoA) as a tool to measure the
quality of SPEs.
Consider f as one of the previously defined social cost function (U , D or E).
Notice that f : P → R and, thus, it measures the social cost of an outcome of
the sequential game. For some strategy profile λ ∈ S, we will abuse notation
and write f(λ) to denote the social cost of the outcome of λ according to f .
Definition 2.2. Given a sequential transportation game Γ and a social function
f : P → R, let SPE(Γ) be the set of all Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Γ and σ∗
be an outcome that minimizes f(σ∗). The Sequential Price of Anarchy (SPoA)
of Γ for function f is defined as
SPoA(f,Γ) = max
λ∈SPE(Γ)
f(λ)
f(σ∗)
, (6)
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while the Sequential Price of Stability (SPoS) of Γ for function f is defined as
SPoS(f,Γ) = min
λ∈SPE(Γ)
f(λ)
f(σ∗)
. (7)
The Sequential Price of Anarchy and the Sequential Price of Sta-
bility of a class of sequential transportation games G are defined by
SPoA(f,G) = supΓ∈G SPoA(f,Γ) and SPoS(f,G) = supΓ∈G SPoS(f,Γ), respec-
tively. Again, we will use SPoA(f) and SPoS(f) when the class of sequential
transportation games G is clear from the context. Next, we show an example of
an instance of a sequential transportation game.
Example 2.2. Consider Figures 2 and 3. In this game, there are n = 4
players and m = 2 buses with pi1 = pi2 = (1, 2, 4, 3). In Figure 3, we have
the game depicted in its extensive form where it is also indicated the
SPE λ = (1, (1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2), (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1)) with outcome (1, 1, 2, 1), where
actions of a player i is ordered from left to right considering the nodes of level i.
Also, the leaves represent the cost associated with each of players 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. Under the Egalitarian social function, we can see that, for this
instance, SPoA(E) ≥ 5/3 as an optimal outcome values 3 (when players 1 and
2 are together in one bus and 3 and 4 are together in the other bus).
t 1 23 41 1 1 1
Figure 2: Metric instance with four players on a line.
3. Inefficiency of Equilibria in the Sequential Transportation Games
Here, we analyze the Sequential Price of Anarchy and the Sequential Price
of Stability for the sequential transportation games by considering the social
cost functions U , E, and D. We begin by showing that the SPoS, and thus
the SPoA, is unbounded for all these social cost functions when dealing with
non-metric instances. Then, we discuss our results about the value of the SPoS
and SPoA for metric cases of the sequential transportation games.
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12
3
4
(7, 6, 2, 3)
b1
(7, 6, 2, 1)
b2
b1
4
(5, 4, 2, 1)
b1
(3, 2, 2, 3)
b2
b2
b1
3
4
(5, 2, 2, 3)
b1
(5, 4, 2, 1)
b2
b1
4
(3, 6, 2, 1)
b1
(1, 6, 2, 3)
b2
b2
b2
b1
Figure 3: A tree representing a sequential transportation game. Because the permutations
are equal, the tree is symmetric and we draw here just one half of it, where player 1
chooses the first bus. Dashed red edges indicate the action chosen at each node for
SPE λ = (1, (1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2), (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1)). In the leaves, we have the cost of each player
in the associated outcome.
3.1. Non-metric Instances
As one could imagine, following the results of Fotakis et al. [1] stating that
the PoS is unbounded for non-metric instances of the transportation game in
its simultaneous version, we show that the SPoS is also unbounded for social
cost functions U , E, and D when dealing with non-metric instances, even if all
buses’ permutations are equal.
Proposition 3.1. For non-metric sequential transportation games, the
t
1
2 3
X
X0
0
0 1
Figure 4: Non-metric instance with n = 3 players and m = 2 buses, where X is a positive
number.
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12
3
(X, 0, 0)
b1
(0, 0, 1)
b2
b1
3
(X, 1, 0)
b1
(X, 0, 0)
b2
b2
b1
Figure 5: Representation of the SPE (b1, (b1, b1), (b1, b2, b1, b2)). Because the permutations
are equal, the tree is symmetric and we draw here just one half of it, where player 1 chooses
the first bus. Dashed red edges indicate the action chosen at each node.
SPoS(U), SPoS(E), and SPoS(D) are unbounded even restricted to all buses
having the same permutation.
Proof. Consider the instance Γ showed in Figure 4 with n = 3, m = 2, and pi
being equal to the permutation pib1 = pib2 = (1, 3, 2). In Figure 5, we can see the
game in its extensive form where the leaves represent the cost of players 1, 2,
and 3 respectively. Observe that, in any SPE, player 3 will always choose the
same bus chosen by player 2, so both of them will get cost 0. Then, player 1
cannot escape from getting cost X .
Now, in any optimal outcome σ∗ for any social cost function f ∈ {U,E,D},
player 3 is alone in one bus while player 1 and 2 are on the other bus, so
f(σ∗) = 1 for every f ∈ {U,E,D}. Therefore, when X → ∞, the SPoS(f,Γ)
tends to ∞ and the result follows.
3.2. Function D with Metric Instances
Next, we show the value of the SPoS and SPoA for metric instances in
relation with social function D. It turns out that this value is n, which is equal
to the value of the PoA(D) and the PoS(D) for its simultaneous version [1].
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First, we show that SPoS(D) ≥ n and, then, we proceed by showing that
SPoA(D) = n.
Proposition 3.2. For metric transportation games with n players,
SPoS(D) ≥ n, even restricted to all buses having the same permutation.
Proof. For this lower bound, consider a game (N,M,G) where |N | = |M | = n,
and the graph is the one showed in Figure 6. Let pij , for j ∈M , be the permu-
tation (n, n− 1, . . . , 2, 1). It is possible to see that, as long as ε < 1
n−1 , there is
an outcome σ∗ where all players are on the same bus, so D(σ∗) = 1 + (n− 1)ε.
We will show, by induction on the player’s index, that in the outcome of any
SPE λ of this instance, each bus is being used by a single player and, therefore,
we get that the D(λ) = n.
For player 1, her cost is the same no matter what is the choice of the other
players. Now, suppose that all players 1, . . . , i − 1 choose a different bus in
the outcome of λ. For player i, any of the n − i + 1 buses without any of
i’s predecessors cost 1 and every other bus have cost 1 + ε, no matter what
is the choice of players i + 1, . . . , n. Thus, since λ is a SPE, i chooses a bus
different than the buses chosen by players 1, . . . , i− 1. Therefore, in any SPE λ,
D(λ) is n, and hence, SPoS(D) ≥ n1+(n−1)ε for any ε > 0, from where the result
follows.
Corollary 3.3. For metric sequential transportation games with n players,
SPoS(D) = SPoA(D) = n.
Proof. For the upper bound, we have from Fotakis et al. [1] that
D(σ) ≤ nD(σ∗) for any outcome σ and optimal outcome σ∗ and, thus,
SPoS(D) ≤ SPoA(D) ≤ n. Now, we get the lower bound from Proposition 3.2,
and the proof is done.
3.3. Function E with Metric Instances
We begin by showing a lower bound on the SPoS(E), and for this, we show
in Example 3.1 a family of instances proposed by Fotakis et al. [1] for proving
that PoS(D) ≥ n.
13
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. . .
n − 1
n
tε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
1
1
1
1
1
Figure 6: Graph G where d(s, u) = d(u, t) = 1 for all u ∈ N and d(u, v) = ε for all u, v ∈ N .
Example 3.1 (Fotakis et al. [1]). We construct the following metric in-
stance considering that k is a positive integer. The set of players is
N = L ∪ R where L = {li,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} (the left players) and
R = {ri,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} (the right players). Therefore, we have
n = 2km players. Next, we decompose L and R into k levels, where
Li = {li,j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and Ri = {ri,j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. Also, consider graph G as
depicted in Figure 7.
The buses’ permutations are all equal to a permutation pi defined as follows:
every player from level i appears after every player from level j with j > i; every
player from Li appears after every player from Ri for every level i; and every
player li,j ∈ Li (resp. ri,j ∈ Ri) appears after every player li,k (resp. ri,k ∈ Ri)
with k > j.
Proposition 3.4. For metric transportation games with n players and m buses,
SPoS(E) ≥ ⌊ n
m
⌋, even restricted to all buses having the same permutation.
Proof. To show this lower bound, we will use the instances described in Exam-
ple 3.1. We consider that the players are labeled such that the order pi presented
in Example 3.1 is (n, n− 1, . . . , 1) (e.g., player 1 is l1,1 and player n is rk,m).
It is possible to see that there is an outcome σ∗ where all buses are being
14
L R
t
a2 a
a(a+ 1)
lk,m lk,1
l1,m l1,1
1
1 1
1
1
rk,mrk,1
r1,mr1,1
1
11
1
1
Figure 7: Graph G with the following distances (where a is some positive number): d(u, v) = 1
if u, v ∈ L or u, v ∈ R; d(v, t) = a if v ∈ R; d(v, t) = a2 if v ∈ L; and d(u, v) = a(a + 1) if
u ∈ L and v ∈ R.
used in the following way. If m is even, each bus picks up 2k players from only
one group (L or R), two per level. Hence, E(σ∗) = a2 + 2k − 1. If m is odd,
we use one bus to pick up one player from every level of L, one bus to pick up
three players from every level of R, and the other buses described in m even
case. Thus, considering that a+3k−1 < a2+2k−1 (which is true for sufficient
large values of a), we obtain, again, that E(σ∗) = a2 + 2k − 1.
Now, we will show that in any outcome of a SPE λ, each bus contains exactly
one player of each level of L and one player of each level of R.
Notice that Player 1 (l1,1) can choose any bus as she comes last in pi and
obtain the same cost for any choice. Now, for player p, suppose that every
player j < p chooses a bus such that, every bus has at most one player of each
group (L or R) and each level when considering exclusively players 1, . . . , p− 1.
Observe that a player p cares only about the choices of her predecessors, i.e.
players 1, 2, . . . , p− 1, since they are the only ones to come after her in pi.
Suppose player p is player li,j . Notice that, in this case, every bus picks up
one player of each group and each level up to level i − 1, but exactly j − 1 of
them also picks up an additional player on li,j′ with j
′ < j. Thus, li,j chooses
a bus with exactly one player of each group and each level up to level i− 1 and
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no player li,j′ with j
′ < j since its cheaper (by one unit). A similar argument
can be done when p is player ri,j .
Therefore, we have that E(λ) = (2k − 1)(a2 + a) + a2 and, when a → ∞,
E(λ)
E(λ∗) tends to 2k =
n
m
. Notice that a similar proof can be made for the case
where m does not divide n by inserting additional players located at t and at
the end of pi, from where the results follows.
Next, in contrast with the results on the value of PoA related to function E
presented by Fotakis et al. [1] (PoA(E) = 2⌈ n
m
⌉− 1 for n > m and PoA(E) = 1
if n ≤ m), the next theorem shows that the value of the SPoA is worse than in
its simultaneous version for function E even when n = m.
Theorem 3.5. For metric transportation games with n players and n buses,
SPoA(E) = 2n− 1.
Proof. Let σ∗ be an optimal outcome. The maximum value an outcome can
achieve is when all players choose to travel on a single bus, and we argue that
it is an upper bound on the SPoA(E) of (2n− 1)E(σ∗). This value comes
from Fotakis et al. [1], in which they proved that d(u, v) ≤ 2E(σ∗) for all pairs
u, v ∈ N and d(u, t) ≤ E(σ∗) for all u ∈ N . Then, since all players are on a single
bus, we have that the path which will be used by it has only one edge directly
connected to t and the remaining n − 1 edges are used to pick up all players.
Hence, this path values at most (n− 1)2E(σ∗) + E(σ∗) = (2n− 1)E(σ∗).
Now, for the lower bound, we provide a family of instances containing one
SPE with value that matches the given upper bound. These instances are
given by (N,M,G) where |N | = |M | = n, and the graph depicted in Figure 6
with ε = 2. Let pij , for j ∈M , be the identity permutation, i.e., pij = (1, . . . , n).
Observe that an optimal outcome σ∗ is the one where each bus is being used by
a single player, and hence we have that E(σ∗) = 1.
We will show, by backward induction on the player’s index, that there exists
at least one SPE λ where, in its outcome, all players choose the same bus, and
therefore we get that SPoA(E) ≥ 2n− 1. For player n, since she is the last
player to be picked up in all buses, her cost will always be 1 despite the bus she
16
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3 3 3
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3 3 3
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Figure 8: Decision tree for the game with three players. Consider that each of the three edges
of each node is labeled as follows, from left to right: bus 1, 2, and 3. Then, the dashed red
edges indicate the action chosen at each node.
chooses to travel in. Then, for any σ<n, she can set λn(σ<n) = σn−1 (that is
always choose the same bus chosen by player n− 1) and still obtain cost 1.
Now, suppose the claim is valid for all players k + 1, . . . , n, and consider
player k. Here, observe that the actions taken by her predecessors do not in-
fluence her cost because all of them are being picked up before her according
to permutations pi. She has m options of buses which will all give her a cost of
2n− 2k + 1 since, by the induction hypothesis, players k + 1, . . . , n will choose
the same bus as player k, and, therefore, player k cannot avoid traveling with
all of them. Thus, for any σ<k, she can set λk(σ<k) = σk−1 with a cost of
2n− 2k + 1, since her cost will not be influenced by the decisions of her prede-
cessors and she cannot avoid her successors. To have a better insight, take a
look at the decision tree for an instance with 3 players, depicted in Figure 8.
This will lead to an outcome where all players are choosing bus σ1 at each
choice node of the extensive form of this game. Thus, E(λ) = 2n − 1, from
where the result follows.
3.4. Function U with Metric Instances
We begin by showing a lower bound for SPoS(U).
Proposition 3.6. For metric transportation games with n players and m buses,
SPoS(U) ≥ 2 n
m
− 1, even restricted to all buses having the same permutation.
Proof. For this lower bound, consider an instance (N,M,G) where |N | = n,
|M | = m, and the graph is the one showed in Figure 9. For j ∈M , let
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Figure 9: Graph G where d(u, t) = d(u, v) = 0 for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , n −m}, d(u, t) = 1 and
d(u, v) = ε for all u, v ∈ {n−m+ 1, . . . , n}.
pij = (1, . . . , n−m,n, n− 1, . . . , n−m+ 1). It is possible to see that there is
an outcome σ∗ where players {n−m+1, . . . , n} are on bus 1 and the remaining
players are on bus 2, and thus U(σ∗) = m+ m(m−1)2 ε.
Now, in any SPE λ, player n will always choose a different bus chosen by
any of the players {n−m+ 1, . . . , n− 1} since she is the last one to enter
in the game. She can do this because there are m buses and she is in the
last m positions of all buses’ permutations, and therefore she will guarantee
herself a cost of 1. Again, the same argument can be done backwardly for
players {n−m+ 1, . . . , n− 1}, which will also guarantee to all of them a cost
of 1. Finally, the remaining players will get cost 2 independently of their buses’
choice, so U(λ) = m+ 2(n−m) = 2n−m. Therefore,
SPoS(U) ≥
2n−m
m+ m(m−1)2 ε
,
and the results follows when ε goes to zero.
We now show a lower bound on the value of an optimal outcome for U .
Proposition 3.7. Let σ∗ be an optimal outcome. If d is metric, then∑
i∈N d(i, t) ≤ U(σ
∗).
Proof. Because of the triangle inequality, for a player i we have that
d(i, t) ≤ ci(σ
∗), and the result follows.
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Next, we show a general bound for U in any outcome of a transportation
game. Then, using this result, we show a tight bound on SPoA(U).
Lemma 3.8. For a metric transportation game with n players, let σ be an
outcome and σ∗ an optimal outcome for U , then U(σ) ≤ (2n− 1)U(σ∗).
Proof. Let σ and σ∗ be an outcome and optimal outcome for U , respectively.
Let pji be the i-th player to be picked up by bus j and nj = |{i : σi = j}|. Also,
we consider that jnj+1 = t for all j ∈M . We have that
U(σ) =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N |σi=j
ci(σ)
=
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
i · d(pji , p
j
i+1) (8)
≤
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
i (d(pji , t) + d(t, p
j
i+1)) (9)
=
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
(2i− 1)d(pji , t)
≤ (2n− 1)
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
d(pji , t)
≤ (2n− 1)U(σ∗), (10)
where Inequality (9) follows from the triangle inequality. Finally, we get the
Inequality 10 from the fact that the summations are composed by n terms
of d(ji, t), and then we use Proposition 3.7 to get the final result.
Theorem 3.9. For metric transportation games with n players,
SPoA(U) = 2n− 1.
Proof. The upper bound comes from Lemma 3.8. For the lower bound, consider
an instance (N,M,G) where |N | = |M | = n, and the graph that is showed
in Figure 10. Let pij , for j ∈ M , be the identity permutation (1, . . . , n). It
is possible to see that there is a strategy profile λ∗ such that, in its outcome,
player n is on bus 1 and the remaining players are on bus 2, and thus U(λ∗) = 1.
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Figure 10: Graph G where d(u, t) = d(u, v) = 0 for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and d(n, t) = 1.
Now, we can show in a similar way done on Theorem 3.5 that there exists
at least one SPE λ where, in its outcome, all players choose the same bus since
player n can always choose the same bus as player n − 1 and player n − 1
can always choose the same bus as player n − 2, and so on. Therefore we get
that U(λ) = 2n− 1, which completes the proof.
4. Function U in simultaneous games
Since we have introduced the analysis of the utilitarian function U(σ), which
represents the sum of the distances that players will get to t, we will, in this
section, compute bounds for both PoA(U) and PoS(U) for simultaneous trans-
portation games.
We note that the same instance used by Fotakis et al. [1] to show that the
PoA is unbounded for functions D and E, also shows that the PoA is unbounded
for function U .
Corollary 4.1. For non-metric transportation games, PoA(U) is unbounded.
Now, for the metric case, we will analyze its inefficiency by giving bounds
on the PoS(U) and PoA(U). Using the same arguments from Proposition 3.6,
it is possible to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For metric transportation games with n players and m buses,
PoS(U) ≥ 2 n
m
− 1, even restricted to all buses having the same permutation.
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We finish this section by proving that the PoA is Θ( n
m
), where n is the
number of players and m is the number of buses.
Theorem 4.3. For metric transportation games with n players and m buses,
PoA(U) = Θ( n
m
).
Proof. We first prove the upper bound. Let σ be an equilibrium and, as before,
let nj = |{i : σi = j}| and p
j
i be the i-th player to be picked up by bus j in σ,
where we consider that jnj+1 = t for all j ∈ M . Then, by triangle inequality,
we have that, for all buses j ∈M ,
nj∑
k=1
d(pjk, p
j
k+1) ≤
nj∑
k=1
(
d(pjk, t) + d(t, p
j
k+1)
)
= 2
nj∑
k=1
d(pjk, t)− d(p
j
1, t).
By summing up for all buses, we have that
m∑
j=1
(
d(pj1, t) +
nj∑
k=1
d(pjk, p
j
k+1)
)
≤ 2
m∑
j=1
nj∑
k=1
d(pjk, t) = 2
n∑
k=1
d(k, t).
Therefore, there must exist a bus j∗ such that
d(pj
∗
1 , t) +
nj∗∑
k=1
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1) ≤
2
∑n
k=1 d(k, t)
m
. (11)
Since σ is an equilibrium, for all players i such that σi 6= j
∗ and considering
that pj
∗
r is the player that comes after i in pij∗ , we obtain
ci(σ) ≤ d(i, p
j∗
r ) +
nj∗∑
k=r
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1)
≤ d(i, t) + d(t, pj
∗
r ) +
nj∗∑
k=r
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1) (12)
≤ d(i, t) + d(t, pj
∗
1 ) +
r−1∑
k=1
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1) +
nj∗∑
k=r
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1) (13)
= d(i, t) + d(t, pj
∗
1 ) +
nj∗∑
k=1
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1)
≤ d(i, t) +
2
∑n
k=1 d(k, t)
m
, (14)
where both Inequalities (12) and (13) comes from triangle inequality, and In-
equality (14) is obtained using Inequality (11).
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For players i such that σi = j
∗, we have that
ci(σ) ≤
nj∗∑
k=1
d(pj
∗
k , p
j∗
k+1) ≤
2
∑n
k=1 d(k, t)
m
.
Hence,
n∑
i=1
ci(σ) ≤
n∑
i=1
d(i, t) +
2n
∑n
k=1 d(k, t)
m
≤ U(σ∗) +
2n
m
U(σ∗) (15)
≤
(
2n
m
+ 1
)
U(σ∗), (16)
where we use Proposition 3.7 for Inequality (15).
For the lower bound, we use Proposition 4.2, which completes the proof.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have extended the game proposed by Fotakis et al. [1]
by considering it in its extensive form, which we call sequential transportation
games. As a result of it, we were able to give bounds for the Sequential Price
of Stability and the Sequential Price of Anarchy considering social cost func-
tions D, and E, previously introduced by Fotakis et al. [1], and a new utilitarian
social cost function U in simultaneous games. Another contribution is the anal-
yses of the inefficiency of equilibria for function U . All bounds presented are
asymptotically tights for a constant number of buses, with most of them being
tight or asymptotically tight even without this restriction.
As a future direction, we also believe, as Fotakis et al. [1] do, that analyzing
the game with different ways of computing the routes of the buses would be
of great interest. Also, closing the gaps of the Table 1 is another interesting
direction for the research.
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